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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Fudickar and Ortego cases because "the principles laid down
in these cases continue to be applicable today."5
In allowing claimant to pursue claims against the "dis-
tributees of the assets at least to the amount received from the
distribution," the court doubtless intended to limit individual
liability at most to the value of the assets of the corporation
each received.
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J. Denson Smith*
Courts elsewhere have generally followed the rule that an
automobile liability insurer faced by several claimants may
settle with some of them although this may exhaust the insur-
ance fund or so deplete it that a subsequent judgment creditor
may be unable to collect the judgment in full. The rule requires
that the settlement be reasonable and made in good faith. The
supreme court followed this rule in Richard v. Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.1 It rejected the plausible argu-
ment that upon the occurrence of the accident and injury the
insurer became bound to the plaintiff by virtue of the so-called
direct action statute2 for a proportionate amount of the insur-
ance proceeds. In support of its position, the court reminded
that settlements are favored by the law. It was not persuaded
that an alternate procedure, such as interpleader or concursus,
was available to the insurer. It may well be that a solution to
this problem, which is troublesome for both claimants and in-
surers, will have to be provided by legislation.
In Tyler v. Touro Infirmary the supreme court, following
an earlier court of appeal case, held that the failure of a nurse
assisting in an abdominal operation to count correctly the sponges
being removed from the patient was a simple administrative act
not amounting to the rendition of a professional service within
the meaning of an exclusionary clause in a policy issued to
Touro Infirmary. This interpretation of the clause drew dis-
sents from Justices Barham and Summers. While the position of
the dissenters seems more compatible with the language of the
5. id at 243.
6. Id.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 254 La. 429, 223 So.2d 858 (1969).
2. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1962).
3. 254 La. 204, 223 So.2d 148 (1969).
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clause, it is interesting to notice that the wording has seemingly
remained unchanged despite earlier holdings in this state and in
others in accord with the view of the majority.
An interesting and illuminating discussion of what consti-
tutes a "direct loss by windstorm" is contained in the opinion
handed down in Lorio v. Aetna Insurance Co.4 In accord with
the interpretation usually given to such a provision, the view
of the court was that it suffices if the windstorm was the proxi-
mate or efficient cause of the loss notwithstanding the presence
of other contributing factors. A valuable horse, moved from one
stall to another because of damage to the barn by Hurricane
Betsy, died from eating too much wheat, which was contained
in a bin adjoining the stall to which the horse was removed.
Access to the wheat was gained by his kicking or knocking out
two slats of a partition that separated the bin from the stall. The
court agreed that if the evidence had established that the stall
had been weakened by the hurricane so that otherwise the horse
could not have reached the wheat, recovery would have been
allowed. The evidence to support this conclusion was found in-
sufficient. Justice Sanders dissented on the latter point.
In Normand v. Hertz Corp.5 a third party driving a rented
car with the permission of the lessee contrary to a specific pro-
vision of the rental agreement was held not covered by the
lessor's automobile liability insurance. In answer to the con-
tention that the lessee, who was present on the front seat when
the accident occurred, was "using" the car or was "legally re-
sponsible for the use thereof" the court replied that the "actual
use" was not with the permission of the named insured, as re-
quired by the policy. The opinion seems to be in harmony with
the course of recent jurisprudence concerning second permittees.
In Adam Miguez Funeral Home, Inc. v. First National Life
Insurance Co.0 a father procured a policy of insurance on the
life of his son who was in the state penitentiary on a narcotics
conviction. The father was seemingly actuated by the desire to
provide a funeral for his son in the event of the latter's death.
The son was indeed killed in the penitentiary. When the father
explained his purpose to the agent, the agent told him to sign
the son's name to the application. He did so, and the agent signed
as a witness to the signature of the "son." The court found the
4. 255 La. 721, 232 So.2d 490 (1970).
5. 254 La. 1075, 229 So.2d 104 (1969).
6. 234 So.2d 496 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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company bound on the basis of estoppel. Its view was that the
provision in R.S. 22:616 reading, "No life . .. insurance contract
upon an individual . . . shall be made" unless the individual
applies therefor was not aimed at the preservation of public
order or good morals but simply the protection of the rights of
the insured. On the basis of the facts reflected in the opinion,
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was an appealing one but
it seems of doubtful propriety. The apparent primary purpose
of the statutory provision is to prevent wagering on human life,
a practice that has long been discountenanced. This seems to
be borne out by the fact that the provision in question makes
an exception in the case of one spouse insuring the life of an-
other. The evidence indicated clearly that the father was not
engaged in wagering. Although this fact provides moral justifi-
cation for the holding, no exception to cover such a case appears
in the statutory provision.
Cases involving application of the uninsured motorist pro-
visions of an automobile liability policy are increasing in volume.
The position of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal was affirmed
by the supreme court in the case of LeBlanc v. Davis.7 It was
held that an insured claiming uninsured motorist protection is
contractually bound by the terms of the policy to furnish to the
insurer full medical information concerning claimed injuries.
Doing so was counted as a prerequisite to the enforcement of the
right of recovery under the policy. In consequence, the plain-
tiff's suit was dismissed as of nonsuit. Apparently the refusal to
furnish the requested information came after the institution of
suit. Justice Barham dissented for this reason, believing that
the failure of the insurer to seek the required information prior
to suit coupled with its denial of liability constituted a waiver
of its contractual right. Justice Barham's position is appealing,
provided that before the suit was filed the insurer was possessed
of the information it acquired subsequent to the filing. Waiver
involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right. This
might well require knowledge of the facts which call for the
exercise of the right.
In a case of first impression, Barrett v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,8 it was held that there is no statutory
requirement that a policy of automobile liability insurance writ-
ten by a surplus line insurer contain an uninsured motorist pro-
7. 254 La. 439, 223 So.2d 862 (1969).
8. 226 So.2d 74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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vision under R.S. 22:1406D (1). The claimant, whose car was
covered by a surplus line policy not containing an uninsured
motorist clause, was held to have no cause of action against his
insurer. The decision seems to be in keeping with the statutory
provision, which does not provide for such a case.
The cases of Lott v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insur-
ance Co.,9 Rolling v. Miller,'0 Frazier v. Jackson," Collins v. New
Orleans Public Service, Inc.,12 Guidry v. Rhodes,' and Puckett
v. Emmons, 4 all dealing with claims based on the uninsured mo-
torist provisions of liability policies, will be covered in a Com-
ment in a later issue of this Review. As an off-the-cuff opinion,
it appears that the statutory and policy provisions may need
amendment if the purpose of protecting insureds against injury
caused by motorists who are not covered at the time by liability
insurance is to be furthered.
The case of Clemmons v. Zurich General Accident & Lia-
bility Insurance Co.15 contains extended and helpful discussions
in the majority and dissenting opinions of the right of an in-
sured, employing his own counsel by way of defense, to recover
attorney fees from an insurer under a duty to defend.
The supreme court has granted writs in Gremillion v. Trav-
elers Indemnity Co.,' 6 which concerns the effect to be given to
a policy provision requiring that suit be brought within twelve
months following the inception of the loss, and Deshotel v. Trav-
elers Indemnity Co.,17 which poses the difficult question of
whether the responsibility of a father for the torts of his minor
child is vicarious in nature or rather is based on the theory that
he is himself negligent in not properly controlling the minor.
In the latter case the court held that the father was not con-
tributorily negligent nor could his responsibility for the tort of
his minor son be counted as based on his own negligence. In a
per curiam opinion the court recognized that its holding was in
conflict with a prior decision but added that "the present deci-
sion is correct."
9. 223 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
10. 233 So.2d 723 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
11. 231 So.2d 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
12. 234 So.2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
13. 238 So.2d 248 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
14. 231 So.2d 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
15. 230 So.2d 887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
16. 228 So.2d 520 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
17. 231 So.2d 448 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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